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ABSTRACT 
Human and animal decision-making is known to violate rational expectations in a variety of 
contexts. Statistical structures of real-world environments may account for such seemingly irrational 
behavior. In a computerized experiment, 16 capuchins, 7 rhesus monkeys, and 30 humans chose 
between up to three options of different value. The options disappeared and became available again 
with different probabilities. Subjects overwhelmingly chose transitively (A>B, B>C, and A>C) in 
the control condition, where doing so maximized overall gain. However, most subjects also adhered 
to transitivity in the test condition, where it was suboptimal but led to negligible losses compared to 
the optimal strategy. Only a few of the capuchins were able to maximize long-term gain by violating 
transitivity. Adhering to rational choice principles may facilitate the formation of near-optimal 
decision rules when short- and long-term goals align. Such cognitive shortcuts may have evolved to 
preserve mental resources.  
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 1 
Introduction  
We make thousands of choices every day, from the moment we wake up to the moment we 
go to sleep. We choose which clothes to wear, what to eat for lunch, whom to date, and which TV 
show to watch. When we choose among the available options, we try to make the best decision 
based on our preferences – but sometimes we fail. While the consequences of picking a bad 
restaurant are largely irrelevant, other decisions such as choosing a new job, when to have children, 
or for whom to vote have bigger impacts on our lives. However, in real-life situations it can be 
difficult to assess what the best decision is, particularly when the outcomes of our actions are 
uncertain. For example, is it better to buy the more expensive car with all your savings or to buy the 
cheap one that may need more expensive repairs soon? Is it better to sell your shares on the stock 
market immediately when their value starts to decline or is it better to hold on to them in case the 
decline is the result of normal, small-scale fluctuations? This example becomes particularly 
illustrative as individual decisions of large groups of people can impact international stock markets at 
large, and even lead them to crash and cause global financial crises (d’Avray, 2010).  
Rational choice theory is a widely used framework of decision making that proposes a set of 
principles to test and model the preferences humans and animals exhibit when making decisions 
(von Neumann & Morgenstern, 2007). A central idea to rational choice theory is that decision 
makers form consistent preferences so as to maximize their long-term gain. This is a useful concept 
that has traditionally been applied to the economic markets in order to abstract economic laws. By 
narrowing the focus to the pursuit of wealth, rational choice theory has been particularly fruitful in 
describing and predicting microeconomic markets (Hertwig & Ortmann, 2001). For example, 
choices in double auction experiments, in which individuals act both as bidders and sellers, quickly 
meet rational expectations even though subjects were not consciously aware that they maximized 
their profits both collectively and individually (Smith, 1991). Rational choice theory has not only 
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been used to model individual behavior, but also that of entities such as corporations or nations 
(Smith, 1991), and has since been extended from behavior in financial markets to model ecological 
and psychological contexts (Capra & Rubin, 2011). As a result, rational choice theory has been used 
to develop specific, testable predictions to identify those conditions under which decision makers 
behave rationally and those under which they behave irrationally. 
Under rational choice theory, decision makers are assumed to maximize their expected 
utility, that is, to maximize the expected benefits over the expected costs. The concept of rationality 
is not limited to economic scenarios, but has been extended to biological contexts as well. One 
ecological application is optimal foraging theory, which aims to model and predict an individual’s 
best foraging pattern, i.e. the best strategy to maximize the benefits (energy gain) and minimize the 
costs (foraging time and energy spent obtaining food) in order to maximize fitness (Stephens & 
Krebs, 1986). However, deviations from rational expectations demonstrate that it can be difficult to 
apply rational choice principles in more complex environments in which the currency that is being 
maximized is not as clearly quantifiable as financial incentives (Hertwig & Ortmann, 2001). For 
example, an individual that forgoes an immediate reward, which appears irrational now, might 
thereby strengthen long-term cooperative relationships (Brosnan & de Waal, 2014; Rand & Nowak, 
2013). Evolution through natural selection nicely parallels this notion as individuals that maximize 
their expected utility, here in terms of fitness, fare better on average by passing on more genes to the 
next generation. As a result, natural selection is often assumed to favor choices that adhere to 
rational choice principles in general, as it provides a context to rationality (Capra & Rubin, 2011; 
Waite, 2001).  
However, humans and animals often do not act entirely optimally, but deviate from 
economically rational expectations in certain contexts (Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982; Rosati 
& Stevens, 2009; Thaler, 1992). For example, Tversky and Kahneman (1981) presented human 
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participants with equivalent choices that were either framed as gains or as losses, and showed that 
humans avoid risk when presented with a potential gain, but seek out risk when presented with a 
potential loss. A rational individual should ignore the context and base its actions only on the 
payouts, which were identical. Thus, preferences should be the same in both cases. Such framing 
effects are not unique to humans but have also been demonstrated in several animal species (Chen, 
Lakshminarayanan, & Santos, 2006; Krupenye, Rosati, & Hare, 2015; Lakshminarayanan, Chen, & 
Santos, 2011; Marsh & Kacelnik, 2002). This study addresses why and under what circumstances 
irrational behavior occurs in order to better understand, model, and predict irrational decision 
making in humans and animals. 
 
Definition of Key Terms 
Irrational behavior can refer to two aspects: behavior that violates a given rational choice 
principle, and behavior that fails to maximize long-term gains (Kacelnik, 2006). These two aspects 
often, but not always, capture the same behavior. They do co-occur when adhering to rational 
choice principles results in choices that maximize expected utility (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 
2007). In this study, however, they do not; irrational behavior refers to an individual making choices 
that violate the rational choice principle of transitivity. Conversely, rational behavior refers to a 
decision maker that adheres to the principle of transitivity. 
Behaving in a way as if to maximize expected utility, on the other hand, is referred to as 
optimal (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 2007). Importantly, expected utility implies that overall gain 
is maximized over the long run (Rosati & Stevens, 2009). This expectation is expressed as the 
average utility, which results from weighing the individual values of all available options by the long-
term probability of acquiring them. As a result, short-term maximizing strategies may lead to 
different choice patterns among options than the long-term maximizing strategies described here. 
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Similarly, natural selection does not act on individuals’ short-term decisions, as reproductive success 
can typically not be immediately evaluated. For example, the bigger reward might result in a higher 
immediate (i.e., short-term) energy gain, but is suboptimal if the risk of predation is high (i.e., no 
further reproduction, long-term loss; Waite, 2001). Indeed, evolution does not act on the individual 
at all, but rather selects upon populations based on lifetime fitness (Herron & Freeman, 2014).  
 
Transitivity 
This study focuses on irrational behavior with respect to transitivity. This principle states 
that if an individual prefers Option A given the choice {A, B} and Option B in choice {B, C}, then 
it should prefer A in choice {A, C} (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 2007). 
As decisions tend not to be perfectly consistent, transitivity is often defined probabilistically 
(Tversky, 1969). Rather than requiring that an option is always chosen over another, an option is 
said to be preferred when the probability of choosing it is simply higher than the probability of 
choosing other available options. 
Transitive inferences have historically been considered one of the hallmarks of human 
deductive reasoning, evident in children as young as four years old (Bryant & Trabasso, 1971). It has 
since been demonstrated in a wide array of animal taxa: chimpanzees (Boysen, Berntson, Shreyer, & 
Quigley, 1993; Gillan, 1981), a variety of monkey species (Buckmaster, Eichenbaum, Amaral, Suzuki, 
& Rapp, 2004; D’Amato, Salmon, & Loukas, 1985; McGonigle & Chalmers, 1977; Merritt & 
Terrace, 2011; Rapp, Kansky, & Eichenbaum, 1996; Treichler & Van Tilburg, 1996), lemurs 
(MacLean, Merritt, & Brannon, 2008), pigeons (von Fersen, Wynne, Delius, & Staddon, 1991; 
Lazareva & Wasserman, 2006; Steirn, Weaver, & Zentall, 1995; Weaver, Steirn, & Zentall, 1997; 
Wynne, 1997), pinyon jays (Bond, Kamil, & Balda, 2003; Paz-y-Miño, Bond, Kamil, & Balda, 2004), 
scrub jays (Bond et al., 2003), hooded crows (Lazareva et al., 2004), rats (Davis, 1992; Dusek & 
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Eichenbaum, 1997; Roberts & Phelps, 1994; Van Elzakker, O’Reilly, & Rudy, 2003), and fish 
(Grosenick, Clement, & Fernald, 2007). 
These findings are not surprising as transitive behavior can be highly adaptive for a variety of 
species. As one example, transitive inferences allow animals that live in social dominance hierarchies 
to efficiently evaluate social rank in order to reduce overall aggression between individuals 
(Grosenick et al., 2007; Paz-y-Miño et al., 2004). Transitive inference drastically reduces the time 
spent assessing the dominance relationship between every possible dyad, particularly in large groups. 
For example, to assess the hierarchy of a common flock of 250 pinyon jays exhaustively, an 
individual bird would need to learn about 31,125 different dyads (Guez & Audley, 2013; Paz-y-Miño 
et al., 2004). Individuals that infer dominance relationships transitively are able to engage in fewer 
aggressive encounters to collect this information, and consequently increase their fitness. 
Despite the intuitive appeal and the tangible adaptive value of transitivity, both humans and 
animals are known to violate the principle under certain circumstances, particularly when options 
vary along multiple dimensions (Waite, 2001). For example, Waite (2001) demonstrated that 
hoarding gray jays consistently violated transitivity when choosing among three foraging options that 
placed them at different risks of predation. The birds preferred one raisin placed at a short distance 
into a tube over two raisins placed at an intermediate distance (A > B), and preferred the two raisins 
at an intermediate distance to three raisins placed at a long distance into the tube (B > C). However, 
in a choice between one raisin placed at a short distance and three raisins placed at a large distance, 
the jays preferred the latter option (C > A). Such studies suggest that decision makers do not always 
assign absolute values to the options available in their environment and highlights that options 
typically vary across several dimensions (e.g. quality and price). They do not, however, explain why 
we violate rational choice principles under some circumstances but not others. 
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Theories of Irrational Behavior 
Two frameworks have been put forward to explain irrational behavior: bounded rationality 
(Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996; Gigerenzer, Todd, & ABC Research Group, 1999; Goodrich, 
Stirling, & Boer, 2000; Hutchinson & Gigerenzer, 2005; Simon, 1955) and ecological rationality 
(Houston, 1997; Houston & McNamara, 1999; Houston, McNamara, & Steer, 2007; Kacelnik, 
2006). Both views emphasize that decision rules evolve in, and adapt to, complex natural 
environments. 
Bounded rationality holds that irrational behavior is the result of simple decision-making 
heuristics that typically perform well in the real world. While not always optimal, such fast-and-
frugal shortcuts are computationally inexpensive rules of thumb that perform well and lead to 
patterns of decision making that often match those prescribed by rational choice (Hutchinson & 
Gigerenzer, 2005). However, when these heuristics are applied they may occasionally lead to 
irrational behavior that reflects suboptimal choices, both in the natural environments as well as in 
the simplified ones that characterize laboratory experiments. 
According to ecological rationality on the other hand, an individual that acts optimally 
should decide to behave irrationally in certain environments, i.e. when violating rational choice 
principles acts to maximize long-term gain. Such a decision maker is said to act ecologically rational 
because its decision rule fits the statistical structure of the environment. An individual’s behavior 
could therefore be described as both economically irrational (violating rational choice theorems) and 
ecologically rational (maximizing expected utility). In this view, irrational behavior can therefore 
reflect optimal choices under certain conditions.  
The notion that irrational behavior is not always an error but could instead reflect optimal 
decision making is intriguing, but only becomes meaningful once the properties of the environment 
are specified. A particular decision rule can only be evaluated (e.g. in comparison to the optimal 
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decision rule) with respect to the statistical structure of a given environment, and a decision rule may 
be ecologically rational in one setting but ecologically irrational in another. Rational choice theory 
does not answer in which environments optimizing decision makers should violate certain rational 
choice principles and in which environments they should conform to them. 
Because environments include the decision maker itself, some research has focused on 
properties of an individual’s internal state. Houston (1997), for instance, shows that transitivity can 
be violated when an individual’s strategy is prone to errors but costly errors are rare. Similar studies 
demonstrate that individuals can exhibit violations of rational choice principles when they make 
decisions with respect to their energy levels. For example, individuals become more risk-prone when 
food sources do not meet their energetic needs (Caraco, 1981; Dener, Kacelnik, & Shemesh, 2016). 
Thus risk preferences are state-dependent and not stable, as assumed under rational choice theory. 
Such ecologically rational behaviors have been observed in as phylogenetically distantly related species 
as primates, songbirds, locusts, and even pea plants (Caraco, 1981; Dener et al., 2016; Houston & 
McNamara, 1999; Pompilio, 2006; Schuck-Paim, Pompilio, & Kacelnik, 2004), illustrating the wide-
spread need of species to solve decision-making problems. 
Other considerations focus on decision makers’ external environments and how they affect 
the success of decision rules. The Modelling Animal Decisions Group (2014) identifies two 
properties that many real-world environments have in common: spatiotemporal heterogeneity 
(environmental conditions vary over space and time) and positive autocorrelation (environmental 
conditions tend to be more similar in situations that are close in space and time rather than far 
apart). These two properties determine the statistical structure of real-world environments but are 
typically absent from laboratory settings, which aim to isolate key variables in a deliberately 
simplified environment. In fact, both features are irrelevant to a rational decision maker as its actions 
should only depend on its knowledge of the current state of the world and not on past or future 
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states (principle of path independence; von Neumann & Morgenstern, 2007). According to 
ecological rationality however, spatiotemporal heterogeneity and positive autocorrelation are likely 
candidates to explain and predict observed differences in the occurrence of irrational behavior. 
Indeed, McNamara, Trimmer, and Houston (2014) recently used simulation-based 
algorithms to demonstrate that an individual that maximizes its long-term gain can exhibit violations 
of transitivity in a dynamic environment. In their model, three options A, B, and C correspond to 
non-zero foraging options. Importantly, options are not always available. Instead, each option varies 
over time and is associated with probabilities that determine whether it will disappear if it is 
currently available, or reappear if it is currently unavailable. When an individual chooses an option, it 
gains the corresponding reward and is assumed to take some time to process it. This delay, during 
which the individual cannot make another decision, is the handling time of an option. As a result, 
there is an opportunity cost associated with an individual’s choice because better options may appear 
or unchosen options may reappear while it handles the current option. The model therefore also 
specifies that decision makers may choose to do nothing for the next unit of time. 
McNamara et al. (2014) explored this model by systematically manipulating the stochastic 
structure with the described option parameters, and identified specific cases in which the optimal 
decision rules either lead to rational or irrational choices. It is unclear, however, if real decision 
makers would behave so as to maximize their gain and flexibly follow or break the rules of rational 
choice theory when confronted with such environments. 
 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study was therefore to empirically evaluate the model proposed by 
McNamara et al. (2014) by implementing two different environments in a computerized experiment. 
The study addresses the question of why and when humans and animals violate rational choice  
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Table 1 
Option Parameters for Control and Test Condition 
   Control Test 
Option Reward Pr(disapp) Delay Pr(reapp) Delay Pr(reapp) 
A 5 .5 6 .5 6 .01 
B 2 .5 6 .5 2 .5 
C 1 .5 6 .5 1 .01 
Note. Pr(reapp) denotes the probability 𝜆 that a currently unavailable option will 
reappear in the next time step. Pr(disapp) denotes the probability 𝜇 that a currently 
available option will disappear in the next time step. Delays are given as the number of 
four-second time steps. 
 
principles under certain circumstances. Specifically, it investigated a view of ecological rationality, 
which suggests that evolution through natural selection has shaped our cognitive system to behave 
irrationally in situations when rational is not optimal. In doing so, the study aimed to better 
understand, model, and predict irrational behavior. 
Subjects were tested in two conditions with distinct option parameters that call for decisions 
that either violate (test condition) or follow (control condition) the principle of transitivity in order 
to maximize long-term gain. 
The test condition adopted a case detailed by McNamara et al. (2014) and is given in Table 1. 
In particular, here the options varied in their probability of reappearance and the optimal strategy 
prescribes intransitive preferences. McNamara et al. give the intuitive reasons for 
these preferences as follows. Option A should be chosen over Option B because neither option was 
likely to be available once handling was complete. Therefore, the option with the highest reward 
should be chosen. Similarly, B should be chosen over C as it yielded the bigger reward and, 
regardless of the choice, there may not have been any options available in the next decision. Finally, 
and in violation of transitivity, C should be chosen over A. C has a higher rate of gain (1 reward per 
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time step) than A (0.8 rewards per time step) and even if C was not still available after handling, B 
(which also yielded 1 reward per time step) was likely to reappear in the next time step. 
In the control condition, on the other hand, the three foraging options were identical except 
for their value (Table 1). Thus, to maximize expected utility, subjects should have formed a linear 
ranking of the options, directly corresponding to their values. A should be chosen over B, B should 
be chosen over C, and A should be chosen over C. This control environment in which the optimal 
and rational decision rules align rather than oppose each other, allowed to distinguish between 
ecologically rational and alternative decision rules that could have emerged in the test condition (for 
example, “always act intransitively” or “randomly choose a foraging option if any are available.”) 
If individuals act as if to maximize their long-term gain, they should flexibly violate or adhere 
to the principle of transitivity in a way that is consistent with the statistical structure of the task 
setting. This leads to the following prediction: In the test condition, subjects should adopt 
intransitive decision rules, while, in the control condition, subjects should adopt transitive decision 
rules.  
Additionally, this study aimed to evaluate whether different species adopt similar decision 
rules in the presented environments. Three populations (capuchin monkeys, rhesus monkeys, and 
human adults) were tested with the same methodology to gauge whether evolutionary factors may 
shape economic decision rules differently in stochastic dynamic environments. Such an evolutionary 
perspective is useful in shedding light on the function as well as the underlying mechanisms of 
decision-making strategies and biases. By understanding both the shared and unique problems our 
cognitive system faces, we are better able to identify the cognitive building blocks and contextual 
characteristics that influence decisions in animals as well as in our own species.  
Bond et al. (2003) and MacLean et al. (2008) suggest that highly social species outperform 
their less social counterparts in transitive reasoning tasks. Socially complex species are thought to 
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differ in their predisposition to mentally represent information linearly but not in their fundamental 
ability to form transitive inferences (MacLean et al., 2008). Thus, although some species differences 
are evident in transitive reasoning capabilities, the tendency to maximize expected utility is so 
fundamental and integral to evolution by natural selection that it should be wide-spread across 
species and present early on in development. A second prediction of this study is therefore that 
capuchin monkeys, rhesus macaques, and human adults should not differ in their decisions to 
choose according to transitivity or not. 
 
Mathematical Framework 
Following McNamara et al. (2014), decision makers’ choices are described as Markov 
decision processes (MDPs), which are commonly used to model sequential decision making in 
situations where outcomes are not under the full control of the decision maker (Puterman, 1994; 
Sutton & Barto, 1998; White & White, 1989). Rather, MDPs exist in stochastic dynamic 
environments in which the state of the world is determined in part by chance.  
 
Markov Decision Processes 
The basic idea behind MDPs is that an individual can choose the action it takes in a given 
moment but does not know how the action will affect a given environment. As a result of the action, 
the decision maker receives a reward and the environment transitions into a new state with a certain 
probability (White & White, 1989). The MDP employed here has a finite number of states and 
actions, and characterizes time in discrete units called time steps (Puterman, 1994; Sutton & Barto, 
1998). 
Decision epochs.  Decision epochs are moments between time steps during which the decision 
maker is required to make a decision about the action it takes. In the current study, the frequency 
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and spacing of these decision epochs is determined by the handling times of the three foraging 
options (Table 1). For example, choosing Option B leads to an immediate reward of 2 units but 
comes at the cost of a delay for 2 time steps. The subject can only make another decision once the 
current reward has been processed. Decision epochs occur whenever subjects make a choice among 
the currently available options and can therefore be understood as trials. 
States.  The set of states 𝑆 denotes all the possible situations of the environment. Specific 
states are given by individual elements of the set, 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆. In this study, states reflected the currently 
available options.  
𝑆 = {∅, {𝐴}, {𝐵}, {𝐶}, {𝐴, 𝐵}, {𝐴, 𝐶}, {𝐵, 𝐶}, {𝐴, 𝐵, 𝐶}} 
denotes all possible choice sets that could arise as a combination of three distinct options. For 
example, a given state 𝑠 =  {𝐵, 𝐶} describes a situation in which B and C are available, while 𝑠 =  ∅ 
reflects that none of the foraging options are currently available. Thus, the only available option is to 
do nothing. Note that the remaining states, those with at least one foraging option, each also include 
the option to do nothing for a unit of time. For the sake of readability, these are not explicitly listed 
in this notation. 
Actions and rewards.  In this study, an action 𝑎 is an individual’s decision to choose a particular 
option that is available in a given state 𝑠. Actions occur during decision epochs and lead to an 
immediate reward 𝑅(𝑠, 𝑎). That is, the reward depends on the action 𝑎 because its magnitude 
directly corresponds to the option that was chosen. 
Transition probabilities.  𝑃(𝑠′|𝑠) denotes the probability of transitioning from a given state 𝑠 to 
a successor state 𝑠′ in a given time step. When 𝑠 and 𝑠′ are identical, the transition probability 
represents the probability that a state remains the same in the next time step. Transition probabilities 
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reflect aspects of spatiotemporal heterogeneity and autocorrelation in that they determine when and 
how the state of the environment changes. 
In this study, transitional probabilities are determined by 𝜇, the probability of a foraging 
option to disappear if it is are currently available, and 𝜆, the probability of an option to reappear 
when it is currently unavailable. The calculation is straightforward because the three foraging options 
change independently of each other. 
Importantly, transitions take place every time step rather than every decision epoch. 
Consequently, the environment changes dynamically during the handling time of every option. For 
example, a subject that chooses Option C in a given state gains a 5-unit reward (Table 1). While it 
processes the reward, six time steps pass. That is, the state of the environment changes six times 
before the next decision can be made. Other, perhaps more highly valued, options may become 
available or unavailable during this time. The handling time therefore represent an opportunity cost 
that is associated with a given option and, by extension, with a given action. 
 
Optimization 
Specifying these elements of the MDP provides a description of how the environment 
behaves in response to both chance and specific actions of the decision maker. The MDP does not 
describe how individuals actually behave in this environment, but it does provide procedures to 
determine how an optimal decision maker should behave in order to maximize expected utility. 
Policies.  A set of decision rules can formally be described as a policy 𝜋, that is, a function that 
specifies the option the individual chooses when presented with a particular state. Each of the 
possible states 𝑠 is mapped to an available action 𝑎. For example, an optimal policy that specifies 
𝜋({𝐴, 𝐵}) = {𝐴} would reflect that the individual should choose Option A when presented with the 
state {𝐴, 𝐵}. The same policy might specify 𝜋({𝐶}) =  {𝐶}, indicating that the individual should 
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choose C over doing nothing in the situation that C is the only available foraging option. In this 
study, policies are essentially sets of eight state-to-action mappings that can be understood as 
decision rules. 
The optimal policy is the policy that, if it is followed, maximizes expected utility. It is 
denoted by 𝜋∗ and represents a recommendation function: It takes a state and prescribes how the 
decision maker should act. For each possible state 𝑠, the optimal policy specifies the action that 
maximizes the expected value. As this definition is phrased in terms of expected (i.e. long-term) 
utility, policies are not formed based on (short-term) values of the current options alone but rather 
take into account the likelihood and value of future states. The optimal value of a state is therefore 
defined as the maximum utility the decision maker could gain if it acts optimally in all following 
states. 
Value iteration.  Optimal values can be calculated with the following equation.  
𝑉∗(𝑠) =  max
𝑎
∑ 𝑃(𝑠′|𝑠)
𝑠′
[𝑅(𝑠, 𝑎) + 𝑉∗(𝑠′)] 
That is, the value of a given state s under the policy 𝜋∗ is given by the maximum expected value that 
can result from taking any of the available actions (max
𝑎
). The values of 𝑠 when a particular action  
𝑎 is taken is the average value of all possible successor states 𝑠′ (∑ )𝑠′ . Thus, each successor state’s 
value is weighed by the transitional probability 𝑃(𝑠′|𝑠) of moving from the current state 𝑠 into the 
new state 𝑠′. The value for a particular successor state 𝑠′ is the immediate reward 𝑅(𝑠, 𝑎) of an 
action 𝑎, in addition to the value of the successor state 𝑉∗(𝑠′). By including this one-step look 
ahead, the value of a given state takes into account both the immediate reward and likelihood of 
future states and value of future actions. 
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Since each state has a corresponding optimal value, the formula above actually specifies a 
system of equations, which characterize the optimal values. As a result of the one-step look ahead 
relationship, these values can be calculated recursively through a fixed number of iterations. 
Policy extraction.  Once these optimal values 𝑉∗(𝑠) are calculated for each of the eight possible 
states 𝑠, determining the optimal action for each state is straightforward. For a given state 𝑠, the 
optimal action is the action 𝑎 that produces the optimal value 𝑉∗(𝑠):  
𝜋∗(𝑠)  = arg max
𝑎
∑ 𝑃(𝑠′|𝑠)
𝑠′
[𝑅(𝑠, 𝑎) + 𝑉∗(𝑠′)] 
The resulting state-to-action mappings specify the optimal policy to which the policies that subjects 
exhibit in this study were compared. 
 
Methods 
Subjects 
Thirty undergraduate participants (26 female, 4 male, mean age M = 21.33, SD = 4.66 years) 
of Georgia State University were recruited through an online system and earned course credit for 
participation in the experiment. Sixteen capuchins monkeys (Cebus apella, nine female, seven male) 
and seven rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta, all male) at the Language Research Center of Georgia 
State University were also tested. Capuchin monkeys were socially housed and separated voluntarily 
into adjacent cages for testing. Rhesus monkeys were individually housed with continuous auditory 
and visual access to other monkeys and when possible, regular social periods with compatible 
partners. Water was available to the monkeys ad libitum and all food used was in addition to their 
daily diet of vegetables, fruit, and primate chow. 
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Figure 1. Example display of three options and the cursor. 
 
General Procedure 
Stimuli.  Subjects continually made decisions by choosing between up to three options A, B, 
and C on a computer screen (Figure 1). The cursor (a solid red circle) appeared in the middle of a  
color display at the beginning of each trial. Options were placed randomly in one of four possible 
positions on a white background (centered at the top, bottom, left, and right). 
Each option was associated with a reward, a delay, a probability of disappearing, and a 
probability of reappearing in the next time step (Table 1). That is, not all options were always 
present. Rather, at the end of each time step, options that were currently available became 
unavailable (i.e., disappeared) with probability 𝜇. Conversely, options that were unavailable became 
available again (i.e., reappeared) with probability 𝜆. In addition, subjects always had the option to do 
nothing in the coming time step. The handling time of an option reflected an opportunity cost 
because individuals could only choose an option every decision epoch rather than every time step. 
Thus, options could come and go during the delay that followed the previous choice. 
Design.  Each subject was tested in two conditions with distinct statistical structures that 
called for either irrational or rational decisions in order to maximize expected utility (Table 2). The 
conditions used two distinct sets of icons of different shapes and colors to represent the three 
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Table 2  
Optimal Policy Between Pairs of Options From Table 1 
 Optimal Policy 
State Test Control 
{A, B} A A 
{B, C} B B 
{A, C} C A 
Note. The optimal policy specifies the preferred option to be chosen in a given 
state. In both conditions, A should be chosen over B, and B should be chosen 
over C. However, in the control condition, the optimal policy is transitive (A 
should be chosen over C), while in the test condition, it is not (C should be 
chosen over A). 
 
options. The assignment of icons to options was counterbalanced across subjects. In the test 
condition, the probabilities of reappearance and handling times varied between the three options 
(Table 1). An individual that acts optimally in this environment should act in violation of transitivity. 
In the control condition, the probability that an option would reappear in the next unit of time and 
its handling time were constant. Here, an individual that maximizes its long-term gains should 
adhere to transitivity. 
Choices.  Subjects could choose among the options during trials that lasted a maximum of 
four seconds. Non-choice during a trial was considered as a decision to do nothing for a unit of 
time. If one of the three options was selected, subjects were rewarded according to the value of the 
selected option. Rewards were dispensed at a one-second rate, each preceded by a ‘ding’ (an A tone 
note). The decision was followed by an inter-trial interval that represented the handling time of the 
option. This delay consisted of a number of four-second time steps depending on the selected 
option. Subjects received their rewards during this delay, but were not be able to make another 
choice until the next trial. The next choice was made at the end of the current handling time.  
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Probe trials.  In the test condition, Options A and C had low probabilities of reappearing 
(Table 1, 𝜆 = .01) and were each only visible approximately every 100 time steps. As a result, critical 
trials, those in which at least two of the options A, B, and C were available at the same time, 
occurred very rarely by pure chance. In the last session of the test condition, that is, after subjects 
had considerable exposure to the task (see below), subjects were therefore presented with occasional 
probe trials to better assess decision making with respect to transitivity. In these sessions, 12 probe 
trials for the critical choice sets ({𝐴, 𝐵}, {𝐵, 𝐶}, {𝐴, 𝐶}, and {𝐴, 𝐵, 𝐶}; see below) appeared 
throughout the session in a randomized order. Subjects’ choices during probe trials were not 
reinforced in order to preserve the original reward contingencies. 
 
Species-specific Procedures 
To accommodate the population-specific testing environments and to ensure subjects’ 
motivation, the general procedure was adapted for testing the different species with respect to the 
hardware, rewards used, and testing schedule. Notably, the number of decisions an individual made 
depended not only on the number of time steps but also on which decisions it made. This is because 
choosing any of the rewarded options A, B, and C determined the length of the inter-trial interval to 
reflect the handling time of an option. For example, an individual that, over 6,750 time steps, chose 
randomly between rewarded options if there were any available, would have made approximately 
4,300 decisions in the test condition and 3,300 in the control condition. The large number of time 
steps with which subjects were presented accounts for the possibility that subjects might stop 
participating for some period of time, e.g. due to lack of motivation or distraction. As time in the 
experiment runs continually, however, non-choices were excluded from analysis.  
Monkeys.  Both capuchin and rhesus monkeys indicated their choices by moving the cursor 
displayed on a 17’’ color display with a joystick. They received banana-flavored food pellets as  
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Figure 2. Photograph of the experimental test setup for the monkeys. 
Subjects controlled an on-screen cursor with a joystick and received 
banana-flavored pellets as rewards. 
 
rewards (Figure 2; for detailed information about the testing system, see Evans, Beran, Chan, Klein, 
and Menzel, 2008). Subjects participated in multiple sessions for a total of approximately 20 hours 
(18,000 time steps) per condition. A session presented either the test or the control condition and 
monkeys alternated between the two conditions from session to session (within-subjects design). In 
addition to the 12 probe trials in the last session of the test condition (6 each of {𝐴, 𝐶} and 
{𝐴, 𝐵, 𝐶}; the choice sets least likely to occur by chance, Table 1), monkeys were also presented with 
12 probe trials in their first session of the test condition (3 each of {𝐴, 𝐵}, {𝐵, 𝐶}, {𝐴, 𝐶}, and 
{𝐴, 𝐵, 𝐶}). These early probe trials were administered after approximately 90 minutes of first 
exposure to the test condition and formed a baseline measure in order to 1) assess changes in 
decision rules over time (by comparing them to the later probe trials) and 2) better compare the 
decision rules with those of the human participants (who only participated in one test session; thus, 
these early probe trials for the monkeys presented a fairer comparison). 
Humans.  Humans made their choices by moving the cursor with the arrow keys on a 
keyboard. They received points that added to their total score displayed on a 19.5’’ color display. 
Participants received minimal instructions stating that they would make decisions by using the arrow 
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keys on the keyboard. Participants were tested in one sessions that lasted 90 minutes and presented 
either the test or the control condition (between-subjects design). Twelve probe trials (3 each of 
{𝐴, 𝐵}, {𝐵, 𝐶}, {𝐴, 𝐶}, and {𝐴, 𝐵, 𝐶}) for the participants in the test condition were administered 
after approximately 45 minutes of exposure to the task. 
 
Data Analysis 
Policy extraction.  Each subject’s choices were modeled as a policy 𝜋 in the Markov decision 
process described above to evaluate the choices the subject made in response to given states. Each 
of the eight possible states  
𝑠 ∈ 𝑆 = {∅, {𝐴}, {𝐵}, {𝐶}, {𝐴, 𝐵}, {𝐴, 𝐶}, {𝐵, 𝐶}, {𝐴, 𝐵, 𝐶}} 
was mapped to the action 𝑎 that was most frequently chosen by the subject. These policies were 
then examined for adherence to the principle of transitivity and optimality. For instance, a policy 
function that included the following assignments was transitive. 
𝜋({𝐴, 𝐵}) =  {𝐴} 
𝜋({𝐵, 𝐶}) =  {𝐵} 
𝜋({𝐴, 𝐶}) =  {𝐴} 
These assignments correspond to the statements A is preferred to B, B is preferred to C, and A is 
preferred to C. This policy would be optimal in the control condition but suboptimal in the test 
condition. As subjects’ policies were determined based on their most frequent action in a given state, 
extracting transitive patterns satisfies the definition of weak stochastic transitivity (Tversky, 1969). 
Every subject’s policy was classified as transitive or intransitive and optimal or suboptimal. 
Chi-square tests of independence were used to evaluate whether the number of observed policies in 
these categories differed significantly in the three species. P-values were computed using Monte 
Carlo tests (Hope, 1968) with 10,000 replicates.  
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Policy evaluation.  An individual’s policy (its eight state-to-action mappings) was then evaluated 
against the optimal policy 𝜋∗. For fixed policy evaluation, values which describe the expected utility 
for each state were calculated based on the subject’s policy.  
The result was a vector 𝑉𝜋 of eight values for each subject, where  
𝑉𝜋(𝑠) =  ∑ 𝑃(𝑠′|𝑠)
𝑠′
[𝑅(𝑠, 𝜋(𝑠)) + 𝑉𝜋(𝑠′)] 
That is, the value of a given state 𝑠 under the policy 𝜋 is given by the average value of all possible 
successor states 𝑠′ (∑ )𝑠′ . Each successor state’s value is weighed by the transitional probability 
𝑃(𝑠′|𝑠) of moving from the current state s into the new state 𝑠′. The value for a particular 
successor state 𝑠′ is the immediate reward 𝑅(𝑠, 𝜋(𝑠)) of a choice 𝜋(𝑠) made when presented with 
state 𝑠, in addition to the value of the successor state 𝑉𝜋(𝑠′). That is, the value of a given state takes 
into account both the immediate reward as well as the likelihood of future states and the value of 
future actions. The fixed-policy values 𝑉𝜋 for each subject were calculated through a recursive 
algorithm that iterated for the total number of time steps 𝑛 that the subject experienced. Note that 
this process is equivalent to but more efficient than that for the optimal policy because the policies 
were already known. In contrast to identifying the optimal actions, here only one action per iteration 
needed to be evaluated rather than all available actions for each state. 
Different policies paint different pictures in comparison to the optimal policy. For example, 
the policy “always pick the option with the shortest handling time” would produce different values 
than the policy “always do nothing” or the policy “avoid Option C.” Each subject’s values 𝑉𝜋 were 
then compared to the optimal values 𝑉∗ that the eight states would have after 𝑛 time steps following 
the optimal policy. This represents the discrepancy between an individual’s policy and the optimal 
policy for each state. The difference of these value averages indicate a subject’s average deviation 
from the optimal policy. 
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The values for a given policy cannot, by definition, exceed the values of the optimal policy, 
i.e. 𝑉∗ ≥ 𝑉𝜋. The deviations from the optimal values are therefore always positive. One-tailed t-tests 
were conducted to evaluate whether the values of a subject’s policy differed significantly from those 
of the optimal policy. The hypotheses are formally given by: 
𝐻0: 𝜇 =  0 
𝐻1: 𝜇 > 0 
Retention of the null hypothesis suggests that the sample policy tended to be optimal or led 
to little long-term loss, while rejection of the null indicates that the average deviation is significantly 
larger than zero, i.e. the sample policy tended to be significantly worse with respect to maximizing 
long-term gain than the optimal policy. Notably, while there is a single optimal policy that maximizes 
expected utility, suboptimal policies can lead to long-term gains that are close to optimal. A non-
zero but negligible difference between subjects’ policies and the optimal policy may indicate decision 
heuristics that are independent of adherence to transitivity. 
 
Results 
Observed Policies 
Table 3 shows subjects’ observed policies in the control and test condition. Chi-square tests 
of independence revealed that the frequency of these policies varied across species in the test 
condition, χ2(4) = 9.34, p = .048, but not in the control condition, χ2(2)  = 4.99, p = .134. Almost all 
subjects in each of the three species found the optimal, transitive strategy in the control condition. 
In the test condition, capuchin monkeys were more likely to find the optimal, circular policy (31%) 
than either rhesus macaques (0%) or humans (0%), standardized residual: z = 2.00, p = .046. 
Interestingly, the three human participants who followed a suboptimal policy in the control 
condition avoided making any choice when the biggest option (Option A) was absent. In fact,  
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Table 3 
Policies Observed in the Control and Test Condition 
 Control  Test 
Species 
Optimal 
Transitive 
Suboptimal 
Other 
 
 
Optimal 
Circular 
Suboptimal 
Transitive 
Suboptimal 
Other 
Capuchins  16 (100%) 0 (0%)  5 (31%) 10 (63%) 1 (6%) 
Rhesus 7 (100%) 0 (0%)  0 (0%) 5 (71%) 2 (29%) 
Humans 12 (80%) 3 (20%)  0 (0%) 13 (87%) 2 (13%) 
Note. Capuchin and rhesus monkeys each participated in both conditions (within-subjects), 
whereas humans participated in either the control or the test condition (between-subjects). 
 
human participants showed this preference on the population level as well (Figure 3). Due to the 
underlying statistical structure of the control condition (Table 1), each of the eight choice sets, or 
states 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆, appeared at approximately the same frequency. Subjects could not make a choice when 
there was no foraging option on the screen (empty set, 𝑠 = ∅). Therefore, subjects who chose 
options at similar rates (and, by extension, chose to do nothing at similar rates) should show a 
proportion of 1
7
 = .143 across the remaining seven choice sets. Capuchin and rhesus monkeys do 
show this pattern in the control condition, whereas humans preferentially made choices when 
Option A was present and tended to skip decisions that only presented Options B or C (Figure 3). 
In the test condition, the underlying probabilities (Table 1) overwhelmingly produced an empty 
screen or only Option B to choose, and the response patterns of humans and monkeys were 
virtually identical.  
 
Policy Evaluation 
Table 4 shows the results of the fixed policy evaluation which compared all observed, 
suboptimal policies against the optimal policy for that condition (transitive in the control condition;  
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Figure 3. Proportion of choices (M ± SE) allocated to each of the choice sets. 
Solid line and circles depict pooled data for capuchin and rhesus monkeys. Dashed line and triangles 
depict human data. Monkey and human data are offset by a small horizontal amount to reduce 
overplotting. Dotted line indicates equal proportion, 1
7
 = .143. The empty set is not represented 
because no choice could be made when no foraging option was present. Probe trials are not shown. 
 
circular in the test condition). The humans who did not find the optimal transitive policy in the 
control condition followed a policy of choosing A over both B and C, and avoiding B (i.e., A > B, 
C > B, and A > C), which resulted in significantly lower long-term gains (ps < .001).  
Notably, none of the subjects who followed the suboptimal, transitive policy in the test 
condition (choosing A > B > C) incurred significant losses (all ps > .05). That is, for the majority of 
subjects, the iterated values for the transitive decision rule did not differ significantly from the 
optimal values derived from the circular policy (choosing A > B, B > C, and C > A). Only a few 
other suboptimal policies emerged in the test condition and, strikingly, all led to significantly lower 
values compared to the optimal policy (ps < .001).  
Interestingly, all of these alternate policies are themselves transitive in that they form linear 
preference rankings: “choose A, avoid B” (A > C > B), “choose B, avoid A” (B > C > A), and  
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Table 4 
Policy Evaluation of Observed Suboptimal Policies and Deviation From Optimality 
Species Subject Condition Policy 𝜋 ?̅?∗ − ?̅?𝜋 t df p 
Humans KH45 Control Choose A, avoid B 1.19 4.25 14 < .001     
Humans KH76 Control Choose A, avoid B 1.17 4.18 14 < .001     
Humans KH89 Control Choose A* – – – – 
Capuchins Bias Test Choose B, avoid A 7.01 24.99   14 < .001     
Capuchins Bailey Test Transitive 0.06 0.21 14 .417 
Capuchins Gambit Test Transitive 0.20 0.73 14 .240 
Capuchins Gonzo Test Transitive 0.20 0.72 14 .243 
Capuchins Gretel Test Transitive 0.17 0.59 14 .281 
Capuchins Griffin Test Transitive 0.19 0.66 14 .259 
Capuchins Liam Test Transitive 0.18 0.66 14 .261 
Capuchins Logan Test Transitive 0.19 0.67 14 .258 
Capuchins Mason Test Transitive 0.19 0.67 14 .257 
Capuchins Nala Test Transitive 0.18 0.65 14 .263 
Capuchins Nkima Test Transitive 0.20 0.70 14 .247 
Rhesus Chewie Test Choose A, avoid B 20.32   72.82   14 < .001     
Rhesus Hank Test Choose B, avoid C 7.22 25.78   14 < .001     
Rhesus Han Test Transitive 0.18 0.65 14 .264 
Rhesus Lou Test Transitive 0.20 0.70 14 .249 
Rhesus Luke Test Transitive 0.09 0.33 14 .374 
Rhesus Murph Test Transitive 0.21 0.76 14 .230 
Rhesus Obi Test Transitive 0.22 0.79 14 .221 
Humans KH09 Test Choose A, avoid B 1.17 4.18 14 < .001     
Humans KH92 Test Choose B, avoid C 0.40 1.44 14 .086 
Humans KH03 Test Transitive 0.02 0.08 14 .471 
Humans KH20 Test Transitive 0.02 0.08 14 .471 
Humans KH22 Test Transitive 0.02 0.08 14 .470 
Humans KH23 Test Transitive 0.02 0.08 14 .471 
Humans KH28 Test Transitive 0.02 0.08 14 .470 
Humans KH34 Test Transitive 0.02 0.08 14 .471 
Humans KH58 Test Transitive 0.02 0.07 14 .471 
Humans KH59 Test Transitive 0.02 0.08 14 .471 
Humans KH60 Test Transitive 0.02 0.08 14 .470 
Humans KH69 Test Transitive 0.02 0.08 14 .471 
Humans KH77 Test Transitive 0.02 0.08 14 .470 
Humans KH78 Test Transitive 0.02 0.07 14 .471 
Humans KH80 Test Transitive 0.02 0.07 14 .471 
Note. ?̅?∗ − ?̅?𝜋 denotes the average deviation of a subject from the optimal policy. Only suboptimal policies 
are shown (Table 3) because optimal policies, by definition, have a deviation of zero. Lines in bold denote 
significant t-tests at α = .001 (Bonferroni correction). Transitive denotes the policy A > B > C. *Policy could 
not be evaluated because KH89 chose B and C with equal frequency in choice set {𝐵, 𝐶}.  
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“choose B, avoid C” (B > A > C). However, only the transitive policy that is optimal in the control 
condition (A > B > C) reflects a linear ordering by reward size (5 > 2 > 1). 
 
Choices Over Time 
The capuchin and rhesus monkeys had considerably more exposure to the task and therefore 
more time to experience the statistical environments. Figure 4 shows the cumulative proportion of 
the selected options for each of the three critical choice sets, {𝐴, 𝐵}, {𝐵, 𝐶}, and {𝐴, 𝐶}. In the 
control condition, most monkeys quickly converged on the optimal transitive strategy, reliably 
choosing A over C (5 over 1) after approximately 780 time steps, A over B (5 over 2) by time step 
4,300, and B over C (2 over 1) by time step 8,000. Thus, length of acquisition nicely maps to the 
relative difference in value between the options. 
In the test condition, in which critical trials occur much less frequently by chance alone than 
they do in the control condition (Figure 3), most monkeys preferred A over B by time step 10,000 
and B over C by time step 11,600. The choice set {𝐴, 𝐶} occurred very rarely due to chance because 
both options were unlikely to reappear (𝜆 = .01, Table 1) when they were unavailable. Therefore, 
only two time points are shown – the cumulative proportion at time step 10,000 (including the first 
probe trials) and the cumulative proportion at the end (after more than 20,000 time steps; including 
the last probe trials). Of the seven rhesus monkeys, four initially chose in line with the optimal, 
circular policy (C over A), while two did not (choosing A over C), and one chose A and C with equal 
frequency. Six of the seven rhesus chose less optimally over time (i.e., chose A at a higher 
proportion than C than they did at the beginning) and one showed no change. Of the 16 capuchin 
monkeys, nine initially favored C over A, six favored A over C, and one showed no preference. Ten 
of the capuchins showed no change over time, while three chose more optimally and three chose 
less optimally.  
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Figure 4. Cumulative proportion of choices over time for choice sets {𝐴, 𝐵}, {𝐵, 𝐶}, and {𝐴, 𝐶} in the control and test condition. 
Green lines indicate Loess curves for rhesus and capuchin monkeys combined. Solid lines indicate individual capuchins; dashed lines indicate individual 
rhesus monkeys. Bottom right: Point size reflects the number of individuals. Note that this choice set occurred very rarely by chance alone because both 
options were unlikely to appear in the test condition (Table 1). 
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Discussion 
Successful decision rules readily emerged in the dynamic stochastic environments presented 
here, which implemented key characteristics of the real world. In the control condition, virtually all 
humans, rhesus macaques, and capuchin monkeys followed the optimal transitive policy, which 
maximized both short- and long-term gains. In the test condition, only 5 of the 16 capuchins and 
none of the rhesus or humans found the optimal policy of violating transitivity, which maximized 
long-term but not short-term gains. The majority of subjects again chose transitively with respect to 
reward size, which maximized short-term but not long-term gains in the test condition. Notably, this 
transitive policy was the only suboptimal policy that consistently led to negligible overall losses 
compared to the optimal policy. Other suboptimal strategies did, in fact, result in decreased long-
term gains. 
These results are compatible with models of bounded rationality, which explain suboptimal 
behavior as the byproduct of simple decision-making heuristics that typically perform well but 
sometimes fail. Transitivity is a computationally inexpensive mental shortcut and can, as in this 
study, lead to near-optimal performance even when it is suboptimal. These results initially appear 
counter to models of ecological rationality, which would predict behavioral policies to match the 
statistical structure of the environment, leading to intransitive decision rules in the test condition. 
However, individuals can only act within their cognitive restraints. Choosing transitively on the basis 
of a linear preference ordering only relies on knowledge of the reward size and does not require 
more sophisticated information processing to integrate factors such as an option’s handling time and 
different probabilities of disappearing and reappearing. Arguably, it is ecologically rational to 
preserve mental resources when they are available, especially when there is no statistically detectable 
benefit to more complex decision mechanisms. That is, acting transitively may be both rational 
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because it is in accordance with rational choice theory and ecologically rational, even in an 
environment in which it is not optimal, albeit nearly so. 
In this study, there were no a priori assumptions about how subjects developed their decision 
rules or about the underlying processes that led to particular selections. However, the experimental 
conditions implemented an undiscounted MDP to derive the optimal decision rule in each of the 
specified environments. That is, decisions were based both on the immediate reward of an action as 
well as on an estimated value of the next state but, because there was no temporal discounting 
parameter, decisions consider events that happen farther and farther in the future. However, 
humans and animals alike are known to devalue future rewards, typically preferring smaller, 
immediate rewards over larger, delayed rewards (Stevens, 2014; Stevens & Hauser, 2004). 
Uncertainties inherent in the environment have, in fact, been hypothesized to select for such 
tendencies to discount the future. Therefore, the stochastic environments implemented here may 
have implicitly favored policies that maximize short-term gain, i.e. the transitive policy A > B > C.  
Further, actual behavioral policies may be prone to errors and probabilistic rather than 
deterministic. This may, in part, have influenced the decision patterns observed in this study, as 
individuals’ strategies can be unexpected with regard to transitivity when they are error prone but 
costly errors are rare (Houston, 1997). For example, in the test condition, the choice set {𝐴, 𝐶}, 
which was critical to the classification of a policy as optimal (circular) or suboptimal (transitive) 
occurred very rarely by chance alone. 
Individual differences in cognitive abilities may explain some of the variability that 
capuchins, rhesus monkeys, and humans showed in the decision rules they adopted in both 
conditions. Better memory and a greater ability to delay gratification may allow individuals to 
maximize long-term over short-term gains and find the optimal decision rule in the test condition. 
Conversely, memory constraints and low ability to delay gratification may constrain individuals to 
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suboptimal policies. However, there is no evidence that capuchin monkeys, the only species who 
found the optimal strategy of violating transitivity in the test condition, generally exceed the self-
control capabilities of humans and rhesus macaques; indeed, they often perform worse in tasks with 
near-identical methodology (Beran, 2015).  
Interestingly, only a few suboptimal policies emerged that were neither circular nor transitive 
(with regard to reward size). These may have emerged because some options were more salient than 
others to some individuals. For example, in the test condition, one option (Option B) was by far the 
most frequently accessible option and individuals might have either chosen to avoid it (memory 
constraints may result in uncertainty about the reward size or length of delay of the other options) or 
to seek it out (which might reflect information seeking). Thus, for some individuals, the prevalence 
of a resource may be more salient than both its absolute value and its long-term benefit.  
For the humans in the control condition, on the other hand, the most salient option appears 
to have been the biggest, most highly valued option (Option A). Indeed, humans preferentially made 
decisions when the choice set included this option and tended to skip trials that only presented 
Options B or C. Note that non-choices (doing nothing for four seconds) could reflect a deliberate 
choice to wait for a better reward, but could just as well reflect lack of motivation or distraction. 
While the distinction poses an interesting question, this study focused on choices that indicated how 
subjects ranked the Options A, B, and C, i.e. decisions in which they explicitly chose one of the 
three rather than to do nothing for a unit of time. 
While human were the only population that showed any suboptimal policies in the control 
condition, there were also a few methodological differences between the experimental procedure for 
the monkeys and humans. Unlike the capuchin and rhesus monkeys, who received food rewards, 
human participants received intangible rewards (virtual points displayed on-screen) rather than 
tangible rewards (such as food or money). The type of reward may have influenced their motivation 
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to maximize. However, Bowman and Turnbull (2003) found no difference in performance between 
real and facsimile money in a task that involved reward maximization under probabilistic 
uncertainty. Moreover, most humans did manage to settle on policies that reached or approached 
maximum long-term gains. 
For practical reasons, human participants experienced the task for only a fraction of the time 
that the capuchin and rhesus monkeys did (1.5 hours compared to 20 hrs). This may have limited 
their ability to abstract the statistical properties of the environment and gain information about the 
options such as reward size and handling time. Particularly in the test condition, in which critical 
trials occurred less frequently and both capuchin and rhesus monkeys formed their preferences 
more slowly than in the control condition, limited information about the environment may have 
favored the adoption of transitivity as a short-term maximizing heuristic. Due to the shorter 
exposure to the task, the unrewarded probe trials in the test condition may also have been more 
salient to the humans and could have influenced their decision rules.  
Decision-making heuristics are fast and frugal. Adopting a policy to choose the biggest 
available food option only relies on knowledge of the reward size, is readily implemented, and may 
therefore be the default strategy. Acting in line with rational choice principles such as transitivity 
may facilitate the formation of near-optimal decision rules when short-term and long-term goals 
align. Learning the statistical regularities of an environment, however, takes longer and decision rules 
that exploit that specific environment may claim additional mental resources but yield little long-
term benefit. Additionally, optimized complex decision rules are more likely to become suboptimal 
when the properties of the environment change. 
However, in a foraging context in the real world, always choosing the largest available reward 
can be suboptimal if the risk of predation is high and individuals adapted to this environment should 
(and do) violate transitivity in order to maximize fitness (Waite, 2001). Similarly, stochastic 
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characteristics of natural environments, such as spatiotemporal heterogeneity and positive 
autocorrelation, are known to bias decision-making and impact fitness in a range of specific 
situations. For example, spatiotemporally heterogeneous environments that vary over time and space 
can bias individuals toward ‘pessimistic’ behavior that does not maximize short-term gains in most 
situations but yields the best outcome in poor conditions because those may have the strongest 
impact on fitness in the long run (McNamara, Trimmer, Eriksson, Marshall, & Houston, 2011). 
However, the current study suggests that the gap between short-term and long-term gains may need 
to be sufficiently large to warrant additional mental resources or to be subject to natural selection. 
As indicated by the five capuchin monkeys who did find the optimal policy in the test condition and 
by the subset of suboptimal strategies that emerged, the valuation of short- versus long-term gains as 
well as the ability to perceive the underlying stochastic structure to begin with appear to be subject 
to individual differences. Mechanistically, these differences may be driven by differential 
representation of or attention to salient features such as absolute reward size, length of delay, or 
frequency of appearance.  
The ability to learn statistical associations and predictive relationships between sets of stimuli 
is relevant in other contexts such as human language. However, in the absence of strong selection 
pressures to attend to regularities in the environment, humans and monkeys rely on rules of thumb 
that may be, or only appear, irrational in certain situations. This study supports recent models of 
irrational behavior as it highlights the importance of assessing decision rules in the context of the 
natural environments in which they evolve. While a heuristic perspective can account for the 
transitive decision rules that emerge in some environments, it fails to explain adaptive decision-
making in situations in which short- and long-term gains stand in starker contrast. 
Future comparative work examining decision rules in dynamic stochastic environments 
would benefit from explicitly modeling a temporal discounting parameter when deriving the optimal 
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policy for a given statistical structure. Experiments testing these models in the future would benefit 
from assessing memory capacity and self control (e.g., the ability to delay gratification), as individual 
differences in how much immediate benefits are valued over future ones may help predict whether 
emerging decision rules will maximize short-term or long-term gains.  
The current study could only glean limited results from the human participants, whose data 
should therefore be interpreted with caution. Future studies that provide human participants with 
equally extensive exposure to the statistical structure of the environment would be better able to 
compare populations. Comparative research investigating how decision-making strategies develop in 
children may additionally help illuminate not only the phylogeny but also the ontogeny of both 
simple heuristics as well as complex decision processes.  
Finally, the costs of suboptimal behavior in this study were relatively low, both in terms of 
amount of reward and number of missed opportunities. One way to address this issue would be to 
study scenarios in which the stakes are high and errors are costly. Specifically, this might be achieved 
by manipulating the reward sizes, increasing the handling times (and thereby opportunity costs), or 
by implementing an explicit choice to do nothing that requires a physical action rather than inactivity 
for a period of time. More broadly, future work should evaluate the consequences of irrational 
behavior in the species’ actual environments. For example, to increase ecological validity, future 
studies should assess decision strategies in (hypothetical or actual) scenarios in which the costs are 
high not only for the individual but also for the community, e.g., voting, business, or court decisions 
(for human participants). Considering the human and animal decision makers as part of an uncertain 
environment with specific statistical properties will allow us to better understanding, model, and 
predict irrational behavior – particularly when the stakes are high. 
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